I N a 1964 paper entitled 'Religion and state in the Songhay empire, 1464-1591', 1 I examined the way in which the dynamic of the Songhay rulers' relationship to religious authorities, both indigenous and Islamic, changed during Songhay's imperial period. My model there was of the 'magician-king' Sunni 'All who, at least initially, ruled over a more or less culturally homogeneous state in which Islamic concepts of political legitimacy played but a small role. I contrasted him with the 'pilgrim-king', Askiya al-hdjj Muhammad (and his successors) who was heir to a more culturally diverse state which he further expanded, and in which Islamic concepts of political legitimacy were more widely accepted as the norm. Although I stressed the continued strength of Songhay religious beliefs and the need for the askiyas to recognize them, I also argued that in general the askiyas paid court to Muslim men of religion, and especially to the Timbuktu scholars ('ulamd') .
In 1990 Michael Gomez took up the discussion again in his article 'Timbuktu under imperial Songhay: a reconsideration of autonomy'.
2 He argued that I and others who have written on the matter had exaggerated the extent of Timbuktu's autonomy and the extent of the influence of its scholars with the askiyas. This revisionist view, based on a more functionalist interpretation of the local chronicles, stresses the economic importance of Timbuktu to the askiyas and asserts that the city remained under the ' firm control' of Gao, its only 'autonomy' being in purely local matters. While I agree with the general thrust of such conclusions and with his call for a more critical reading of our sources, I want to go beyond the dichotomous model of 'autonomy' versus 'firm control' and attempt a more nuanced reading of the relations between rulers and scholars, which seem to me to have been of a more ambivalent and more delicately negotiated nature than Gomez's * Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the annual meeting of the African Studies Association in 1984 under the title ' Sanctity and privilege: holymen and the state in the Songhay empire' and to the International Symposium on 'Morocco and Africa at the beginning of the Modern Age', Marrakesh, Mohammed V University, 23-5 Oct. 1992 , under the title 'Piety and power: relations between the religious estate and the ruling estate in Songhay under the Askiyas'. I am grateful to Ben Soares for reading and commenting on the latter version and to Carl Petry for a critical reading of the present version of this paper; also to Muhammad Sani Umar for a stimulating discussion of it. None of them is in any way responsible for its shortcomings.
1 Paper presented to the Fifth International African Seminar, Ahmadu Bello University, Jan. 1964, and published in I. M. Lewis (ed.) ( Islam in Tropical Africa (London, 1966) , 296-317. 2 'Timbuktu under imperial Songhay: a reconsideration of autonomy ', jf. Afr. Hist., xxxi (1990) , 5-24. model might suggest.
3 I also want to broaden the category 'scholars', which may be too subjective a term, to include a broader range of persons whom one may, for convenience, call the 'religious estate' of the realm. This term would include not only those most generally referred to as 'ulamd' -the qddis and other respected jurisprudents and teachers -but imams, khatibs, Sufis, ascetics, pietists (sulahd') and in general all those who may be described as ' holymen'. The term ' holyman', which in a sense embraces all the categories (many of which tend to overlap), is intended to correspond to (among others) the Manding term 'morV (or at a higher level of learning 'karamoko'), the Fulfulde 'cerno', the Hausa 'malam', the Songhay and Yoruba 'alfa', the Sudanese Arabic 'feki', the Somali 'wadad' and the ubiquitous 'marabout' of French-Arabic terminology. My argument is that while such holymen rarely have a decisive say in affairs of state, yet at the same time their influence -subtle, even silent -upon the ruler may be considerable.
Let me begin by defining my terms. By 'secular power' I mean the power -grounded in (but not solely dependent on) access to armed might -to govern, that is to order society with hierarchies of power, to raise revenue, to defend itself and those it governs and, in some sense to ' provide' for its people. The term 'secular' is used in the sense of an approach to power that is essentially pragmatic, that is not dictated by a religious or other ideology. Though it may accept and operate within the general culture of a religion, it is guided in most matters by principles of efficacy in carrying out the tasks of government it considers necessary to perform, and in maintaining itself in power.
By 'religious authority' I mean an assumed authority to guide and order people's social -and to varying extents economic and political -lives in accordance with an interpretation of what the holders of such authority claim to be divine authority, which overrides authority established by 'secular' powers. The authority, although characterized as 'assumed' is nevertheless grounded in the ability of those who claim it to convince their fellow-men of their special access to ' divine' authority and to be acting as agents for it. At the heart of this claim lies the perceived ability of such agents to bring benefit or to wreak harm upon the rest of society -in short to invoke blessing or curse. In Muslim societies this authority may be derived inter alia from the ability to interpret texts (especially the Qur'an and legal texts), in the case of the 'ulamd', or from the ability to have access to divine power through 'miraculous' acts (kardmdt), in the case of 'Friends of God' (awliyd'), or through a direct mandate from heaven, as in the case of those who claim to be the Mahdi.
There has been a constant tension in the Muslim world between the realities of secular power and the idealism of those who claim religious authority, which has tended to find its most powerful expression in moments of economic and social disruption -the current period of 'Islamic reassertion' being a clear case in point. To put it another way: the tensions in Muslim societies caused by economic or social dysfunction express themselves most readily through the medium of claims to religious authority. Since religious agents have often been the ones who took a stand against the injustices of rulers, acting as lightning rods for popular discontent, governments have had to find ways to deal with them, either by suppression or cooptation under a variety of guises.
This tension between secular powers and religious authorities has been resolved historically in a number of different ways:
(1) The secular power might hold its own and keep the religious authorities in check by physical suppression, either on an individual or communal basis. This happened, for example, following the Sa'dian conquest of Songhay in 1591 when the more vocal of the 'ulamd' were arrested and deported to Morocco. In more recent times various Egyptian governments have used imprisonment and execution to stifle social and political criticism by the Muslim Brotherhood and its successors including the current campaign against the Islamic Group (al-Gamd'a al-islamiyya) and similar organizations; it is also the response of the current Algerian military government to the violent wave of anti-government protest embarked upon by the Front Islamique de Salut and numerous splinter groups. In the 1920s Ataturk tried a more radical solution by simply disestablishing the Muslim scholarly/pious elite and proclaiming Turkey a secular state. (2) The secular power may co-opt the religious authorities if they are not too diverse and divided. This is an uneasy situation that tends to end up by radicalizing whatever sections of the religious authorities are left out. It was tried by colonial authorities, with varying degrees of temporary success in the Sudan, Nigeria and Senegal. In Egypt the al-Azhar authorities were often co-opted by governments both pre-and postrevolution, with the result that the Muslim Brotherhood was able to present itself as a radical alternative source of religious authority. D. B. Macdonald summed up the process of scholarly protest and co-optation by 'secular' governments in his article 'Ulamd' in the Encyclopaedia of Islam: ' Whatever the de facto government might be [the scholars] were a curb on it, as a surviving expression of the Agreement (al-ijmd') and the right of the People of Muhammad to govern itself. The different governments might try to control them by giving them official status and salaries and to some extent might succeed in that. If the success was too glaring the people would react by contempt for such government agents and would give their respect and devotion to private scholars who refused to be thus muzzled'.
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(3) There might be a revolutionary alliance between religious authorities and a secular power to produce a regime in which the secular authority retains political power, but the religious authority dictates -to a greater or lesser extent -the social and economic agenda. In some cases this could be a way of containing a purely religious revolution. A third example might be the Iranian revolution of 1979, in which the secular power of the Shah was successfully challenged by a religious authority -the Ayatollah Khomeini. There was widespread popular support, and the demoralized army of the Shah was subverted by a coalition of forces. The result was the Vilayet-i-faqih, in which supreme authority resided in a man who claimed religious authority as the guardian for a future charismatic authority -the Twelfth Imam -and as the master interpreter of the law. (5) There is a fifth possibility -a situation in which a genuine equilibrium is achieved between secular powers and religious authorities. The secular power rules -orders society, raises revenue, defends or expands the realm and provides security for its people. The religious authority remains to a great extent independent of the secular power and operates in a symbiotic fashion relative to it. Neither threatens the other, but each has the ability to put pressure on the other. The religious authorities do not dictate government policy, yet they may influence it. The secular authority may appoint religious functionaries within its capital, but in the rest of its territory it is circumspect in regard to the religious authorities who act as shapers of public opinion and can mobilize support for or against the government.
It may be argued that this is, indeed, the model set up by the Islamic source texts. The key Qur'anic text is: 'Obey God and obey the Messenger and those among you who have authority'.
5 Hadiths on the need to obey political authorities abound, one of the most widely cited being: 'Whoever dies without having sworn an oath of allegiance {bay 1 a) [to a lawful governing authority], dies a jahill death'. 6 While there is in classical Sunni political theory some encouragement for political passivity -not to revolt against a ruler for any reason short of his renouncing the faith -a ruler's failure to act justly may be interpreted as a sign of his having apostatized and hence justify revolt. 7 The need to retain the support of the religious authorities is hence quite pressing. On the other hand, even if the loss of such support does not lead to open rebellion (the less likely outcome), it may result in the moral condemnation of the religious authorities and a situation in which they no longer pray for the ruler but pray against him, pleading with God for his downfall and his moral or physical degradation.
This fifth type of situation is the one that seems to have been normative in much of the Sudanic belt of Africa in the period c. 1400-1800 from the Funj kingdom of Sinnar in the east to Songhay in the west (until 1591) and including Dar Fur (seventeenth to eighteenth centuries) and Bornu from c. 1470-1800. The secular authorities -the 'ruling estate'-provided various incentives for religious agents to migrate into their kingdoms and settle, and in return to perform certain religious services for them. These incentives included: land grants; grants of privilege (jdh or hurma), especially exemption from sultanic imposts; donations in cash and kind (especially slaves); the right to give sanctuary (including the acknowledgement by rulers of towns of sanctuary).
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The quid pro quo from the side of the ' religious estate' -as these religious agents in time came to constitute -included: the outflowing of baraka; withholding of curses; making of protective amulets; intercession with God ('purchasing' a portion of Paradise); conducting ceremonies for rulers, e.g. Qur'an recitation, celebration of the Prophet's birthday; 9 drafting of official documents; in the Sudan, provisioning of soldiers on occasion. With this preamble in mind, we shall now look in some detail at the case of imperial Songhay, more especially during the period of Askiya al-hajj Muhammad (reg. 1493 Muhammad (reg. -1528 and his descendants in the period down to the Sa'dian conquest of 1591.
10 Songhay consisted of a core territory originally conquered by Sunni 'All (reg. 1464-92), on both banks of the Middle Niger from a little upstream of Jenne round to the area of Kebbi close to the modern Nigerian border, to which the exertions of Askiya al-hajj Muhammad added a much vaster tributary area of' indirect rule' to east and west. It is not difficult to argue the case for there having been a Songhay ruling estate which held secular power in the terms I have outlined above. I have elsewhere referred to the Songhay system in the sixteenth century as a 'neptocracy', in which all the rulers but one were direct descendants of the Askiya al-hajj Muhammad and most high offices were distributed among brothers or sons of the ruling askiya.
11 There was thus a very specific group, mostly related by blood, that held onto the reins of power. Certainly men not belonging to the family held office even in the core territory (and obviously so in the tributary territory), but essentially the ruling institution revolved round sons and grandsons of Askiya al-hajj Muhammad. There was certainly some overlap between the ruling estate and the religious estate. At least one member of the Askiya family had studied in Timbuktu. The ' chaplain' of the askiyas, the askiya-alfa, clearly had a position in which political overtones were inevitable. Even the historian al-Sa'df, for all his apparent bias towards the religious estate, worked for many years in the service of the Bashalik.
To define a religious estate is more difficult. Holymen belonged to many different ethnic/linguistic groups and to different families within such groups. Nevertheless, I would argue that common ideology grounded in Sunni MalikT Islam, common training and common ambitions helped to weld together a broad spectrum of persons of diverse origins and varied levels of learning, to give such people a sense of common identity; and that as such they may be considered to have constituted a 'religious estate'. In terms of education, there was the Qur'anic base which also implied some literacy in Arabic, however modest. This alone distinguished them from both peasants and warriors, though not, perhaps from merchants who, in some cases were an overlapping category. Students from small towns and villages such as Diakha, Kabura, Sao and Tindirma, might move on to the great centres of learning, Jenne and Timbuktu, or to more distant regional centres such as Walata, Takedda or Katsina. There they would pursue the higher flights of theology, law, logic, Arabic language, pietistic literature, Sufism and so on, the common denominator being the MalikT law school and 10 The relations of the ruling estate with the non-Muslim religious authorities will not be considered here. Such relations were undoubtedly important, especially in the eastern half of Songhay, but our sources afford us only the faintest glimpse into them. On the continuing vigour of Songhay religious cults in the twentieth century, see Jean Rouch, La religion et la magie songhay (Paris, 1960) the theology of al-Ash'an. Sufism, too, was of a broad sort and not split by later tariqa allegiances.
There are other senses in which the scholarly/pious shared a common outlook and ambitions. They were all connected by their literacy and learning to a wider stream of history which went back to the Prophet Muhammad, indeed in a large sense back to the Old Testament prophets, who were also Qur'anic prophets. They came mainly from the western reaches of the Songhay empire, where the populations were largely nonSonghay. They were Arab, Berber (Sanhaja), Fulani, Soninke, Dyula, even if in a city like Timbuktu the Songhay language was the common tongue. They lived in an area that was still something of an island in a sea of 'paganism'. Their neighbours were the non-Muslim Dogon, the Mossi, the Bamana. Even the Songhay despite many centuries of contact with Muslims were evidently not deeply islamized away from the towns.
12 All of these factors, then, contributed to create in those who had some degree of Islamic learning a sense of belonging to a special group -a 'religious estate' -literate, able to offer effective prayer or curse, able to one extent or another to discourse on theology and to pronounce on the law.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
It is important to recall the historical circumstances in which this balance of relationships that I am proposing between the ruling estate and the religious estate evolved. Askiya Muhammad had come to power in 1493 through a coup d'etat following (possibly even causing) the death of his predecessor Sunni 'All, laying claim to a throne to which he apparently had no hereditary right and defeating and putting to flight the 'legitimate' successor, Sunni 'All's son Abu Bakr Da'u (Bukar Dao). The state he then presided over was largely the creation of Sunni 'All who, during the course of his reign, had expanded the relatively small, predominantly Songhay, state lying along the eastern reaches of the Middle Niger into a large empire stretching all the way round the 'bend' of the River Niger and including Timbuktu and its desert hinterland and the inland delta region to beyond Jenne. As noted above, these conquered lands were largely inhabited by non-Songhay populations who were in the main Muslims with, in many cases, a historical depth of several centuries in the faith. In Timbuktu, Jenne, Diakha and Kabura, there were well-developed traditions of Islamic scholarship and pietism, the influence of which radiated out into the countryside where minor scholars and holymen were influential figures in the smaller towns and villages.
Askiya Muhammad seems to have come to power with the support of forces raised in these more islamized westerly regions. The area lying between Timbuktu and Jenne, however, was important to him for much more than this, just as it had been to Sunni 'All. It contains a vast area of fertile land that was annually enriched by the silt brought down by the River Niger, which flooded it for several months of the year, and in addition contained the two great interlinked commercial centres of Jenne and Timbuktu that were of pivotal importance in the lucrative gold-salt trade and a less dazzling but economically significant trade in grain. As I have suggested elsewhere, the prosperity of the gold-salt trade in particular had been seriously threatened by Sunni 'All's numerous campaigns in the area and his extractions from the merchants.
13 Askiya Muhammad was therefore concerned to restore stability and confidence there, and the continuing tranquillity of the area, and the loyalty of its inhabitants may be presumed to have been a similar concern to his successors.
Such concerns seems to be reflected in the cordial relations he and several of his successors cultivated with the religious estate, most of whose members appear to have originated from these western regions -even those who were resident in Gao, such as the khatibs, whose names (Cisse, Diakhite, Darame) suggest Manding origins. The active goodwill of the holymen of the western regions would have helped ensure the loyalty of the populations among whom their influence was felt. The goodwill of the qadi of Timbuktu not only ensured the loyalty of that city, where religion and commerce were so closely intertwined but may also have been a contributing factor in retaining the loyalty of southern Saharan nomads, many of whom were ultimately of the same Sanhaja stock as the qadis. 1 * Marriage ties further strengthened relations between the ruling estate and nomads on the one hand and with the religious estate on the other. Both Askiya al-hdjj Muhammad I and Askiya Dawud married daughters of theirs to nomad chiefs (Maghsharan-koi), and Askiya Dawud further consolidated his relations with the religious estate (and with the 'commercial estate') by marrying daughters of his to them.
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Such complex patterns of patronage and marriage were no doubt powerful adjuncts to sheer military might in holding together a state as large and diverse as Songhay.
After the overthrow of the regime of the askiyas and the establishment of the Bashalik under Sa'dian tutelage in 1591-2, Timbuktu slowly lost its preeminence as a centre of learning. There are a number of reasons for this. One of them is no doubt the very fact that the city then became the political centre of gravity under a military regime in which converts of convenience (otherwise called 'renegades' or 'uluj) and eunuchs (technically 'slaves') played a major role in an administration that owed loyalty (at first in reality and later at least in theory) to a remote master. Such a regime effectively robbed scholars of their independence, since it would not have been possible to render judgements without risk of continuous political interference. Signs of disaffection were dealt with severely. The arrest of the leading scholars (and the killing of those who resisted) and the deportation of members of the AqTt family also clearly had a negative effect on the cultivation of higher learning.
Secondly, the Bashas themselves do not seem to have been (at least until much later) patrons of holymen in the same way as the askiyas were in the sixteenth century. The special relationship between the political power and 13 Ibid. 334-5. 341-2-14 In 1588, however, his influence was insufficient to prevent the Timbuktu-koi and the Maghsharan-koi from supporting the Balama's attempt to seize the throne. See 'Abd alRahman al-Sa'df, Ta'rikh al-sudan (hereafter TS), ed. and trans. O. Houdas (Paris, 1898-1900), 125/200. the religious authorities broke down. The Bashas for a long time pursued a heavy-handed policy with little attempt to work with the religious estate. The men of religion, thus alienated, began to leave Timbuktu (if they were not already exiled), and the city went into a period of intellectual decline while towns such as Walata and Katsina began to flourish. It is likely too that kingdoms to the south in the savannah also benefited from an exodus of religious agents from the lands ruled by the Bashas.
THE BIAS OF THE SOURCES
The second part of this paper will be devoted to a detailed examination of the mechanisms of patronage used by the Songhay rulers and the responses of the religious estate which together helped to maintain this equilibrium for approximately a century. Unfortunately, our evidence comes principally from books written by members of that religious estate, and there is little doubt that they would have presented these relationships in the light most flattering to themselves. These sources, for example, make much of askiyas al-hajj Muhammad I and Dawud respectfully calling upon qddis of Timbuktu, listening to their reproaches, seeking their baraka and 'being submissive' to them. 17 Baraka is too complex a term to allow simple translation. As a general statement we may describe it as a beneficent force of divine origin that may bring both material and spiritual benefit to those to whom it is communicated or who acquire it from those who possess it. An exhaustive study of baraka and its manifestations in Morocco may be found in Edward Westermarck's Ritual and Belief in Morocco (London, 1926) Nuzhat al-hddi, wrote that Askiya al-hdjj Muhammad was ' greatly respectful of the religious leaders (a'immat al-din) and very fond of the scholars, showing them the greatest honour. He would make a place for them in his audiences and give them handsome gifts'. 20 We need not, however, accept uncritically the often self-serving accounts of Ahmad Baba about his ancestors or the 'tales' told by the chroniclers which may belong more nearly to the literature of karamdt. A clearer picture of relations between the ruling estate and the religious estate in Songhay may be gained through the accounts of gifts of such things as slaves, land, cattle, cloth and cash, as well as exemption from state obligations and taxes. A further sign of the respect which at least some of the askiyas had for the religious estate is to be seen in the power of intercession that some of the holymen could exercise with the rulers, and the recognition by rulers of the quality of hurma that holymen and their houses, as well as mosques, might possess. Of course, not all the askiyas showed such respect for the religious estate -Askiya Musa was notorious for his rejection of a special status for holymen -but this again highlights the need to search for a more multifaceted and nuanced picture of these relations.
While the accounts given by the chroniclers of gifts and privileges showered on some of the religious estate may in individual cases be exaggerated, the frequency of accounts of such acts makes it difficult to imagine that we are dealing with mere fabrications. Comparative evidence also helps to inspire confidence. There are parallels to these practices throughout the Sudanic belt -in Borno at about the same period (and perhaps earlier) and in Dar Fur and the Funj kingdom in the following two centuries. Thus, while we still have to rely on literary accounts produced by the very group whose relationships we are trying to examine, there is a sense of being on somewhat safer ground when we read accounts of specific transactions; for even if we argue that a particular account does not represent a transaction that actually took place, we would nevertheless argue that they are representative of the type of relationships that must have existed. We would argue this not only because we can see clear parallels with other Sudanic societies, for which we have evidence based on independent documents rather than literary accounts, but also because a forgery must of necessity very closely resemble the genuine article.
GIFTS AND LAND GRANTS TO HOLYMEN
The askiyas were not the first Songhay rulers to make gifts to holymen. Sunni 'All, despite his hostility to certain holymen -notably the AqTt family of Timbuktu and the Hawgaro clan of Mori Koira -in fact made gifts of sixteenth century: scholarly and sharifian networks', presented to the International Conference on Fez and Africa, organized by the Universite Mohammed V (Rabat) in Fez, 28-30 Oct. 1993. 20 See translation in J. O. Hunwick,' Askia al-Hajj Muhammad and his successors: the account of al-Imam al-Takrun', Sudanic Africa, 1 (1990), 85-9. Since we do not know when this author wrote or what his sources of information may have been, it is possible that he was merely paraphrasing some other author. However, his nisba al-Takrun suggests that he was of West African origin, and thus the likelihood of his having been an actual witness is increased.
female slaves for concubinage to those who found favour with him. AlSa'dT's ancestor 'Abd Allah al-BalbalT was one of those so favoured. 21 He had particularly warm fetlings for certain scholars of Timbuktu, and his hostility towards those of Sanhaja origin is certainly related to the fact that the rulers he supplanted in Timbuktu were Sanhaja. Indeed, the city was founded by Sanhaja and retained a strong Sanhaja cultural orientation, only coming within the Songhay cultural and linguistic orbit after Sunni 'All's conquest.
Information on gifts to holymen is more abundant when it comes to the askiyas, especially al-hajj Muhammad and Dawud. On one occasion Askiya Muhammad is reported to have sent the qddi Mahmud of Timbuktu a concubine and a gift of 1,000 mithqdls of gold (equivalent to about 4.25 kg/150 oz), the only condition attached to the gift being that he give any child born of the concubine the name of the askiya -Muhammad. A male child was duly born and named Muhammad. He became qddi on the death of his father in 1548 and enjoyed close relations with Askiya Muhammad's son Dawud (reg. 1549-82) . 22 The qddi Mahmud was from the Sanhaja family of AqTt, which had suffered at the hands of Sunni 'All. The Askiya's gift to him and other signs of deference were no doubt intended to highlight the contrast between Askiya Muhammad and Sunni 'All, as well as to ensure the loyalty of the religious estate in Timbuktu.
A second case also concerns a family that had suffered at the hands of Sunni 'All. Eight grandsons of Mori Hawgaro, an intimate of Askiya Muhammad but not from Timbuktu, came to the Askiya bemoaning their sufferings at the hands of Sunni 'All. Each subsequently received one hundred head of cattle, we are told, and ten slaves with a promise that they should receive a like gift in every year of the Askiya's reign. This story may have been embellished in the telling, but more interesting is the 'document of immunity (kitdb hurma)' which the grandsons asked for and were granted by the Askiya, the text of which -albeit I believe with some dubious emendations -has been preserved in the pages of the Ta'rtkh al-fattdsh. It will be discussed in the next section of the paper.
Even more detail is provided in the Ta'rikh al-fattdsh on gifts made to members of the religious estate by Askiya Dawud, thanks to the close relationship with this askiya enjoyed by Mahmud Ka'ti, who was himself the recipient of several such favours. In a long passage designed to praise the generosity of his patron, Ka'ti details gifts of parcels of slaves that the askiya gave to holymen out of the goods and chattels left by a deceased state official that reverted to the Askiya. They were said to have been given out in parcels of 27 as follows:
(1) To Askiya-Alfa Bukar, the Askiya's secretary/'chaplain'.
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(2) To the Great Mosque (presumably of Timbuktu -Jingere-ber) -t h e males to repair it and the females to weave mats and rugs for it. 21 The women were Fulani and hence, it is implied, Muslims. Al-Sa'dT comments:
'Those who had no care for the dictates of their religion [took them as concubines] while those who had, took them in marriage'. He points out that his ancestor was one of the latter. The woman he was given became the mother of his father's grandmother; hence it was important to al-Sa'dT to establish that she was, and was treated as, a free woman. See TS, 67/110. 22 See TF, 82/154. 23 The title Askiya alfa meant 'the askiya's scholar/holyman', and he appears to have been the askiya's religious counselor.
(3) To the imam of the Great Mosque, in return for which he was asked to offer prayers for the Askiya's pardon and forgiveness. (4) To the imdm-khatib of Gao another parcel of 27 for him to give away or to sell and distribute the proceeds to those entitled to receive alms (sadaqa). (5) To the shartf 'All b. Ahmad for himself and his family.
Finally the qadi of Timbuktu al-'Aqib was given one hundred for his own use, for his family and for others thought deserving of them. In return the qadi was asked to be the Askiya's 'agent' to 'purchase' for him a place in Paradise. 24 Ka'ti mentions two occasions on which he received gifts from Askiya Dawud and one on which Askiya Ishaq I showed him generosity. On one occasion Ka'ti claimed that he received a gift of ten cloaks (thawb) and five slaves from Askiya Dawud as a reward for having saved him from divine wrath over the incident of the 'Kanta pilgrim', a story which will be discussed below. On another Ka'ti says he boldly approached the askiya through his personal holyman Askiya-Alfa Bukar, and asked for a number of gifts for himself and his children. Unlike the scholars of Timbuktu, who are portrayed as never seeking out the askiya, Ka'ti seems to have had no scruples about attending the askiya's court and asking favours. Among the gifts he says he received were a farm, 13 slaves to cultivate it and seed to plant it. This is the only clear example of a holyman being granted land, but it is unlikely that it was an isolated incidence of such grants. The forged MS C passages of the Ta'rikh al-fattdsh (written in the early nineteenth century but purporting to refer to the reign of Askiya al-hdjj Muhammad) 25 mention several exaggeratedly large grants of land and servile persons to holymen. Even though the historicity of these grants is dubious, such accounts may still be considered supporting evidence for the occurrence of royal land grants to holymen in the time of the askiyas. Not only is there one clear example of the practice for the sixteenth century, but the argument made above that a forgery imitates the genuine article may again be invoked in support. The nineteenth-century forger must have known what pieces of evidence he could invent which would have a ring of authenticity for his readers.
Thus, though hard evidence for royal land grants to holymen in the sixteenth century is slender, what we have is nevertheless suggestive of an 24 See TF, 107-8197-99. We may contrast this picture of a rather pliant qadi who accepted gifts from the askiya with the much sterner portrait of al-'Aqib left to us by his kinsman Ahmad Baba: ' He was of stout heart, bold in the mighty affairs that others shrink from, courageous in dealing with the sultan and those under him. He had many confrontations with them and they would be submissive and obedient to them in every matter. If he saw anything he disapproved of, he would suspend his activities as qadi and hold himself aloof. Then they would conciliate him until he returned'. See Ahmad Baba, Nayl al-ibtihaj bi-tatriz al-dibaj, on margin of Ibn Farhun, al-Dibaj al-mudhahhab fi ma 'rifat a'yan 'ulama' al-madhhab (Cairo, 1351 'rifat a'yan 'ulama' al-madhhab (Cairo, /1931 institution similar to one which we find more abundantly documented in other areas of Sudanic Africa a little later on -notably in Dar Fur and the Funj kingdom of Sinnar in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries -the land grants to holymen known as jdh and hdkura.
2 * The granting of privilege to holymen, especially relief from state taxes and services, which is a marked feature of such relations in both the Nile valley and in Borno, was also clearly a feature of relations between the ruling estate and the religious estate in Songhay, and it is to such practices that we now turn.
GRANTS OF PRIVILEGE
Three cases of rulers granting privilege to holymen are recorded in the chronicles -two in the Ta'rikh al-fattdsh and one in the Ta'rikh al-sudan. Two of these cases involve the intercession of a holyman which results in pardon for the individuals concerned and exemption for them and their clan from 'royal obligations ' (wazd'if al-saltana) . The third, which is recorded in a document embedded in the text of the Ta'rikh al-fattdsh, not only grants exemption from royal obligations and taxes {gharama) to the descendants of a holyman but extends these privileges to their subsequent descendants along with the right to be judged by the askiya or his successor in cases of claim against them. This 'document' (despite the apparently forged nature of a codicil to it) echoes both in form and language later documents of privilege from Sinnar and Dar Fur as well as documents of immunity {mahram) issued by rulers of Borno, some of which allegedly date from the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century.
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In all three cases the justification for granting privileges is rooted in the concept of the possession by the recipient, or an ancestor of his, of 'sanctity/inviolability' {hurma or 'isma). 28 In the two cases of hurma it is quite clear that this quality is acquired by physical contact with sacred Islamic objects, either the Ka'ba in Mecca or the Prophet's tomb in Medina -both cities themselves being inviolate/holy areas (haram). But it is also applied to a building (the house of a holyman and a mosque) and one individual even tried to appeal to the hurma of some sacred texts.
Let us now examine the three cases in greater detail:
(1) The sultan of Jenne pardoned a man whom he had threatened with death, in response to the intercession of a local holyman who had previously refused all contact with the ruler. The pardoned man and his clan were also relieved in perpetuity from all state obligations (wazd 'if al-saltana) . 29 The only condition laid on the holyman by the sultan was that he share a meal with him. There are several other references in the chronicles to a ruler sharing a meal with a holyman, and it is clear that this is one way of acquiring some share of the holyman's baraka. This sharing of a meal, according to Westermarck, constitutes a silent covenant between the two parties and embodies a conditional curse, that is if the ruler breaks his word to the holyman, the wrath of God will fall upon him.
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(2) The Case of the 'KantawT' pilgrim. According to the Ta'rikh al-fattash, it was Askiya Dawud's custom to greet returning pilgrims outside his capital, Gao, to share in their baraka, and to present them with gifts of cloth and robes. In greeting them the Askiya would kiss their hands, which would seem to be the way for him to acquire the baraka they brought back with them from visiting the two Holy Places. The 'KantawT' pilgrim was from a low-status group and is described as a 'slave' (mamluk -'possession') of the Askiya, hence perhaps a Sorko. 31 The askiya did not realise this, but when he was about to kiss the man's hand his 'linguist' (wanadu) snatched his hand away, upbraided the 'KantawT' pilgrim and threatened to cut off his hand for daring to present it to the askiya. Dawud then sought the advice of Alfa Mahmud Ka'ti who was accompanying him and who replied as follows:
How should it not be permissible to cut off the hand of one who has stood at 'Arafa and circumambulated the Ka'ba and placed his hand on the Black Stone, then on the Yamani (southern) corner and then used his hand to twice throw the pebbles [symbolically stoning 'Satan'], then 'visited' the Messenger of God -may God bless him and grant him peace -and placed his hand on the Prophet's seat in his noble pulpit and entered the noble atrium (rawda) and placed his hand on the grill [surrounding the Prophet's tomb] and upon the tombs of Abu Bakr and 'Umar ?... On the contrary, the possessor of such a hand should have been sparing of it and preserved it from pollution and refused to shake hands with you! On hearing this, goes the story, the askiya was shamed and turned on his linguist, relieved him of his post and imprisoned him. He then turned to the 'KantawT' pilgrim and said, 'I hereby abandon my claim upon you, on account of the sanctity (hurma) of your hand. I also abandon my claim upon fifty men from your father's clan and fifty men from your mother's clan and also exempt them from state obligations'. 32 (3) Mori Hawgaro's descendants and the hurma document. Mori Hawgaro, a holyman of uncertain origin, 33 had apparently accompanied Askiya al-hajj Muhammad on pilgrimage in 1497-8 and had visited the Prophet's tomb with him. Some ten years later, so the account in the Ta'rikh al-fattash goes, the Askiya was in Kabara when he was approached by some 29 See TS, 18/31-2. 30 See Westermarck, Pagan Survivals, 84-6; also his Ritual and Belief in Morocco, i, On the connection between the Sorko boatmen/fishermen and 'Kanta', the title of the ruler of Kebbi and also (in the chronicles) his kingdom, see my article ' A little-known diplomatic episode in the history of Kebbi (c. 1594) ', J. Hist. Soc. of Nigeria, v (1971), 575-81. 32 See TF, His title, mori-'holyman', is a Manding word.
grandsons of Mori Hawgaro, who asked him to redress wrongs done to them by Sunni 'All. The askiya made them gifts of slaves and cattle, which he promised to repeat yearly. They further requested a ' document of immunity' (kitab hurma) which the askiya ordered to be drawn up. Its principal provisions, as given by the text included in the Ta'rikh al-fattash, are as follows:
(a) The Askiya's officials, both civil and military are warned not to oppress or tyrannize members of the clan. Clauses of similar import appear in several of the Sinnar and Dar Fur charters, while in Borno mahrams the goods and dwellings of the grantee are often made inviolate (haram). (b) The clan is exempted from state obligations and taxes (ghardma).
Nothing may be demanded of them, even 'hospitality' (diyafa). The latter is no doubt a reference to the right of representatives of the askiya to demand food and lodging from whomever they thought fit. Exemption from a similar obligation is also granted in Borno mahrams issued by Mai 'All Gaji Dunamami (late fifteenth century) and Mai Ahmad (late eighteenth century).
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(c) No one but the askiya may hear cases brought against them. The askiya places a conditional curse on any of his descendants who may treat them unjustly. (d) The descendants of Mori Hawgaro are granted the right to take a wife from any group they wish and the offspring of such a union would be free. This is an apparent reference to the fact that offspring of unions of 'noble' men with women from 'servile' groups normally assumed their mother's status.
The only exceptions to this general permission are for the women of two ' servile' groups considered the askiya's personal property, the Sorko and the Arbi. In the version of the document which has survived embedded in the much later Ta'rikh al-fattash, a rider is added under which if this rule is broken the offspring are still considered free but their 'servile' mothers revert to the askiya's possession upon their husband's death or upon divorce. I have argued that this clause is a literary forgery designed to protect the issue of such 'mixed marriages', who in the mid-seventeenth century were openly being sold as slaves in Timbuktu. 35 This, however, does not invalidate the document as a whole as evidence for the issuance of royal documents of privilege under the askiyas. Even if it could be demonstrated that the entire document is a literary forgery, we would still have to suppose that it is modelled on a type of document that was once issued by rulers.
What seems lacking in it, however, is any demand for a quid pro quo. What one would have expected is that the askiya should ask members of this ' holy' clan to offer prayers for the askiya, to intercede with God on his behalf, or to provide some service such as reciting the Qur'an for him. But it seems to be solely the sanctity {hurma) of Mori Hawgaro that entitled them to such privileges. It may be suggested, however, that something is left unspoken. The Hawgaro clan lived in a location called Mori-koira -'holyman's village' -near Dire at the northern end of the Inland Delta of the Niger, and we may 34 See H. R. Palmer, The Bornu Sahara and Sudan (London, 1936), 21, 50. 35 Hunvvick, 'Studies in the Ta'rikh al-fattash V, 133-48. presume that they enjoyed considerable prestige and influence among the Muslims of the area. Their village may, in some ways have resembled the later fuqard' settlements of Sinnar and Dar Fur or the malemtis of Bornocentres of regional influence both spiritual and 'political', to which people flocked to acquire baraka and to seek arbitration in disputes and intercession with local chiefs, and so on. 36 As recipients of the askiya's favours the Hawgaro clan could be expected to preach the ruler's virtues and to support the status quo. Also, perhaps, important to the askiya was the fact that in such a situation he could be sure of avoiding the dreaded curse of the holyman, an aspect of ruler-holymen relations that will be discussed further below.
SANCTUARY AND INTERCESSION
As noted above, the concept of hurma includes within it both the qualities of sanctity and immunity -the holy is untouchable. This is nowhere better illustrated than in the related matters of sanctuary and intercession. The hurma of a holyman enables him in a passive way to provide sanctuary for an offender against the ruler, while on the other hand his hurma in the sense of his sanctity, operates in an active way to secure pardon for the offender through his intercession. Hurma in the sense of sanctuary is primarily a state one may enter into through becoming enclosed by the sacred and inviolate space associated with the holyman -the mosque in the case of an imam or khatib, or the private dwelling in the case of a qddi. 37 But buildings are not the only kind of space in which hurma may be thought to reside. In one case described below an offender attempted to gain sanctuary through the hurma of some books he placed on his head. In another case a man tried to claim inviolability through the hurma of Askiya Muhammad who at the time had been dead for half a century.
Not all rulers were willing to recognize the right of holymen to give protection or the power of their intercession. Askiya Musa, who succeeded Askiya al-hdjj Muhammad, was inclined to turn a deaf ear in such cases, but he paid the penalty. His assassination after only three years in office seems to be attributed by the chroniclers to a curse put on him by a holyman and by the curse of his father who was, of course, possessed of hurma.
The following select cases may help to illustrate the twin themes of sanctuary and intercession. Sudan, 1500 -1850 (Evanston, 1994 on Dar-Fur, see R. S. O'Fahey, State and Society in Dar Fur (Cambridge, 1980) A provincial governor who had participated in the uprising sought the hurma of Alfa Ka'ti whose intercession he wanted to seek. The exgovernor's son opposed this -perhaps fearing that the intercession would not be accepted -and father and son fled to the remote province of Kala on the borders of Mali.
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A group of army commanders and senior functionaries who opposed the accession of Askiya Ishaq II and were trying to place a brother of his on the throne were cornered by the askiya and a body of his loyal troops. They asked for pardon and claimed that they had ' entered the hurma of Askiya al-hdjj Muhammad and the hurma of his feet that had stood before the Messenger of God in his noble atrium (rawda) ' . Surprisingly, they were successful.
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(5) The case already referred to above of the man who offended against the sultan of Jenne and obtained the intercession of the holyman FudT Muhammad Saqu on account of the latter's 'isma.
THE CURSE
In considering the intangible 'spiritual' benefits that the askiyas hoped to acquire from the holymen, we have only so far looked at the positive ones, such as baraka, divine pardon and so on. As hinted at above, there was also what may be called a ' negative benefit' to be gained through the maintenance of cordial relations with the religious estate -avoidance of a holyman's curse. It is clear from the local chronicles that the fear of a holyman's curse was a very real one, for several examples are cited of the efficacy of such a curse, even against the mighty. The ultimate cause of Sunni 'All's death (and even the end of the Sunni dynasty) is attributed to such curses. A holyman cursed Sunni 'All by calling on God to overthrow him as a punishment for violating the holyman's daughter, and sons of Mori Hawgaro who were imprisoned by Sunni 'All called upon God to destroy him and cause him to die as an unbeliever. 43 Askiya Muhammad's triumph over him, and the judgement he obtained from the visiting North African holyman al-MaghTlT, branding Sunni 'All as an infidel, were no doubt seen locally as stemming from these curses.
Askiya Muhammad himself had the power to inflict a curse through his own hurma, a power that was derived from his visit to Mecca and touching the Black Stone of the Ka'ba and the Prophet's tomb. He cursed his son Musa for appropriating his harem and prayed that he should be disgraced by his genitals being uncovered in public. Sure enough, the next day Musa was thrown from his horse and his robes were thrown up over his head ! 44 Askiya Muhammad also put a conditional curse on any of his descendants who should violate the hurma of descendants of Mori Hawgaro. His curse, which called for the humiliation of any who contravened this, was seen by one of the chroniclers to have been effected more than a century later by the humiliation brought on his grandsons through their defeat at the hands of Sa'dian forces and the subsequent puppet status of the askiyas of Timbuktu under Moroccan tutelage. 45 Askiya Musa, as we have noted above, would generally have no truck with holymen. However, in the case of his dealings with a scholar of Jinja, a town in the Inland Delta, despite his rejection of the holyman's intercession and the threat of the holyman's curse, he is said to have stayed his hand from killing him because he 'saw' two huge lions on the holyman's shoulder ready to lunge at him that the holy man was restraining. 46 One further example of belief in the power of the holyman to wreak harm against the mighty involves not an askiya but one of his officials. During the reign of Askiya Muhammad Bani (1586-8), the Kabara-farma 'Alu seized a rice plantation that had been given to one of the 'ulamd' by the askiya. In the dispute that followed the Kabara-/ar»z« knocked the scholar to the ground. A student of this scholar, with the encouragement of the scholar then set about taking revenge on his behalf. On a piece of paper he wrote 'letters and things', then folded the paper and sewed it into a black cloth which he hung on the neck of a ram. He then plunged a spear into the ram at the point where the foreleg is joined to the trunk and the ram died. On the same day the Kabara-farma was killed when the Balama al-Sadiq thrust a spear into him beneath his armpit.
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Similar homaeopathic magic to cause death was also practised by a man skilled in such arts with the help of charms on behalf of Askiya Dawud.
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There is no doubt that this belief in the power of the holyman to curse and to cause death was widespread in Songhay society and that the askiyas shared such beliefs, both fearing them and calling them to their service when needed. 49 There is, even today, a strong belief in the power of the holyman's curse in this area. Africa Confidential reports: 'The late president of Niger, Seyni Kountche, had as an official marabout Oumarou Amadou "Bonkano", illiterate in both French and Arabic. He CONCLUSIONS While the religious estate may not have been united in its views about the Islamic legitimacy of the askiyas, there was general agreement, it would seem, about the legitimacy of Askiya al-hajj Muhammad who had received the authority of the 'Abbasid caliph in Cairo to rule as his deputy and had acquired hurma through his pilgrimage. This legitimacy was considered, to a greater or lesser extent, to have passed down through his descendants, even if they did not inherit his hurma. The askiyas' attitudes towards and relationships with the religious estate were likewise not monolithic. In general (though the exceptions are important) they recognized the benefits to be gained from maintaining cordial relations with the religious estate, both positively as a support to their rule and a guarantee of bliss in an afterlife and negatively so as to avoid the dreaded curse of the holyman; they wanted to be prayed for, not prayed against. While the askiyas may not have allowed state policy to be swayed directly by their intervention (and, indeed, may on occasion have given precedence to the exigencies of state over considerations of hurma), we would argue that within the cultural setting of Islam in that day and age, the members of the religious estate were able to exercise a subtle and pervasive influence upon their patrons and even, at times to express open disagreement. The equilibrium between the ruling estate and the religious estate was thus preserved over a century of Songhay's history, only to be rudely cast aside in 1591 by a regime that lacked roots in local society and whose early leaders were no more than converts of convenience. A generation was to pass before tentative steps were taken to re-establish the symbiotic relationship between secular powers and religious authorities. But by then Timbuktu's moral and intellectual leadership was in decline and the constructive tension between the ruling estate and the religious estate that had characterized the Songhay period, was no longer an operative force.
SUMMARY
The relationship between political power and religious authority has been a delicate one in Muslim societies. On the one hand, governments may attempt to silence religious authorities; on the other, they may themselves succumb to revolutions in the name of religion. More often governments have attempted to coopt religious authorities as allies in exercising control or have worked directly in a power-sharing arrangement with them. In Songhay, as in several other states of pre-colonial Sudanic Africa, a more subtle balance was achieved between the ruling estate and the diverse body of scholars, mystics and holymen who made up the religious estate. The askiyas of sixteenth-century Songhay, while exercising full political power, saw it in their interest to maintain harmonious relations with these men of religion. Gifts in cash and kind, including slaves, grants of land and privilege, especially exemption from taxation, as well as recognition of rights of intercession and sanctuary, ensured their moral support and spiritual services and, importantly, protected rulers from their curse. Such a symbiosis was important for acquired such influence that the president appointed him head of the secret service. Bonkano eventually fell into disgrace and joined a coup attempt in October 1983. Many blame Kountche's long illness and recent death on a curse laid on him by Bonkano.' See 'West Africa: the men of power', Africa Confidential, xxvm (2 Dec. 1987), 5. the stability of a large and ethnically diverse empire like Songhay, especially as regards its conquered western reaches, which were ethnically non-Songhay and had a strong Islamic cultural tradition. This delicate balance was upset by the Sa c dian conquest of Songhay in 1591. Despite Moroccan assertions of Islamic legitimacy, religious authorities in Timbuktu were unsupportive, and harsh measures against them dealt a lasting blow to the equilibrium which had prevailed under the askiyas.
